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This research seeks to develop and test hypotheses about how political disagreement in social
networks affects political behavior. We conduct experimental research to test whether subjects’
acquaintances act as independent sources of information, and examine two different models of
how such social stimuli may produce effects—either via information seeking, or information
shortcuts. These tests are important because prior research is ambiguous on whether causal
effects come from networks, and on potential mechanisms of influence. Our results back aspects
of both models, but more strongly support the notion of disagreement as a heuristic—subjects
primed to consider disagreement before a mock election exhibited a less-orderly information
search process; those primed to consider disagreement after the election (but before voting)
displayed lower rates of ambivalence, and evidence that such information helped clarify their
decisions.
1 Introduction
Disagreement and conflict lie at the center of politics. Without differing viewpoints, there would
be no need for political processes to make decisions, and even less appeal for democratic forms of
governance that balance different interests. But even while disagreement between people is central
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to democratic processes, it is this aspect of politics that many people do not like. For this reason,
it is essential to understand the manner in which people of all political stripes interact with each
other, and to consider what consequences this holds for the engagement in the political process.
When we consider political disagreement among average voters, prior research consistently shows
it to be correlated with a variety of behavioral outcomes. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) provide
evidence that disagreement in interpersonal networks can increase the probability of voting against
your partisan predilections. They follow this with evidence from another study showing similar
effects on evaluations of presidential candidates, though the strength of that effect is contingent
on the remainder of the network.(Huckfeldt, Johnson & Sprague 2004) Taking a different approach
to measurement and outcomes, Mutz (2006) shows that people engaged in what she labels “cross-
cutting political talk”—another version of disagreement—are more likely to tolerate different points
of view, but are considerably less likely to participate in politics. McClurg (2006) demonstrates
that disagreement about politics can influence political participation at multiple levels of analysis,
including both within the network and in social groups such as the neighborhood. This latter finding
is consistent with a body of research on a dangerous spiral of silence that may emerge when people
feel that their views place them in the minority.(Noell-Neuman 1993) Other research has addressed
related questions concerning the potential of different measures of disagreement to attitudinal and
behavioral outcomes (Klofstad, Sokhey & McClurg 2010, Nir 2005, Nir Forthcoming, Wojcieszak
& Mutz 2009, Jang 2009), in different political contexts (McClurg 2006b, Wojcieszak 2011, Ben-
Nun-Bloom & Levitan Forthcoming).
Underlying research on the social supply of disagreeable opinions are two questions about the
nature of networks and behavior. First, to what degree does prior research establish causality?
Some scholars argue that the relationship between networks and politics is likely causal, provid-
ing evidence that political networks help people learn about politics through opinion-leadership
and information-provision (Roch 2005, Huckfeldt 2001, Mutz 2002a, Sokhey & McClurg Forth-
coming, McClurg 2003). Likewise, there is evidence of a link between social networks and political
participation that revolves around both levels of network political disagreement and expertise (Mutz
2002a, Mutz 2002b, Mutz 2006, McClurg 2003, McClurg 2004, McClurg 2006a, McClurg 2006b).
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Yet the reliance on observational data has made it difficult to rule out other possible explanations,
such as reciprocal causality or selection bias (Klofstad 2007). And, even with a series of careful
statistical studies (Kenny 1992, Huckfeldt & Mendez 2008) and field experiments (Gerber, Green
& Larimer 2008, Klofstad 2001, Klofstad 2007, Nickerson 2008) pointing towards causality, more
evidence in different empirical venues is both needed and welcome.
Second, what is the mechanism by which information received from social contacts is processed
and used by citizens to update their political views? Most research in this vein is (loosely) based
on the model offered by McPhee (1963), where political disagreement spurs a more extensive search
for political information. The intuition of “information search” as a mechanism of influence is that
the experience of disagreement should make voters feel less certain and more likely to change how
they approach a decision. But this is only one possible model, and different approaches would have
different empirical and theoretical implications.
We begin to address these question with experiments designed to prime disagreement from
subjects’ self-identified social networks, measuring participant reactions in a mock election en-
vironment. Although there are some nuances to our findings, they support the contention that
disagreement in social networks affects elements of political behavior. At the same time, the ev-
idence points away from the information-search hypothesis and towards an information-shortcut
hypothesis. We are hesitant to conclude that the evidence unambiguously establishes that social
networks cause changes in behavior, noting some of the limits of our experimental design. However,
the results do support previous and growing research pointing toward networks as causal agents,
while pointing toward new directions for understanding how such effects may occur.
The debates we have highlighted are important. American conceptions of liberal democracy
rest on the assumption that the choices voters make in elections—particularly with respect to
which candidate to support—reflect their interests, thereby keeping officials accountable to voters.
Although decades of research show that voters’ cognitive limits leave them falling short of the
standards envisioned by democratic theorists, it also implies that they are able to “make do” by
relying on information shortcuts (e.g., social networks); these allow them to make “good” decisions
in the absence of complete information (Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk 2008). Nevertheless, this poses
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the question of how open to manipulation and coercion these voters are when it comes to external
information flows. Indeed, it is often assumed that social influence is a coercive force. Yet at
least some indications exist to suggest that social networks facilitate good decisions (Sokhey &
McClurg Forthcoming), and even potentially enable a more sophisticated electorate than we would
see in the absence of interpersonal influence (Ahn, Huckfeldt & Ryan 2007).
2 Models of Disagreement
Our series of experiments is designed to explore hypotheses about how political disagreement in-
fluences voting behavior. The goal here is not to provide a full list of theoretical models and
hypotheses, but to consider the distinct implications from models that that have been alluded to in
previous studies. To the extent possible, we want to outline implications that allow us sort evidence
towards different models, but recognize that these models are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
2.1 The No Effect Model
The null hypotheses for this research is that social networks generally—and political disagreement
specifically—have no causal consequences for voting behavior. Underlying this approach is the
assumption that network disagreement and voting behavior are not casually linked, largely because
networks reflect the characteristics of the people in them (selection bias), because interdependence
among people makes it difficult to establish the direction of influence (reciprocal causation), or
because what appears to be disagreement effects are driven by other variables (omitted variable bias)
(Klofstad 2001). From this perspective, citizens who are exposed to interpersonal disagreement will
not make different choices in elections, and whatever differences they exhibit in terms of information
search will be a function of other characteristics.
Although observational evidence indicates that the political composition of social networks is
related to variation in political behavior, this question remains open. Importantly, such corre-
lations may either be a function of how people select networks, or evidence of endogeneity (i.e.,
the respondent affects the network, rather than vice versa). If this is the case, then correlations
seen in observational and quasi-experimental research would disappear in an experiment (Hypoth-
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esis 1). A related—but less stringent—version of this null model is that social networks influence
decision-making, but not by exposing voters to either agreement or disagreement. This would im-
ply that there is a “network effect,” but that it is not contingent on the political content of social
interactions.
2.2 The Information Search Model
Our second model assumes that social networks have effects that stem from how political disagree-
ment influences the search for information during campaigns or in political environments (Huckfeldt
& Sprague 1995, Huckfeldt 2001, McClurg 2003). Underlying this model is McPhee’s (1963) model
of social influence, where citizens form initial opinions about issues and candidates, and then check
them against their network. If they experience agreement they stop searching for information; if
they experience disagreement the information search continues, and they again consult their net-
work once they have updated their beliefs. This suggests that social networks are an informational
guide that is used to update beliefs rather than develop them.
Based on this model, political disagreement should be causal (Hypothesis 2) in the sense that
voters with different networks will exhibit distinct behaviors. Since our focus here is on the presence
or absence of interpersonal disagreement, we would expect that voters exposed to disagreement will
exhibit different voting behavior than those subjects in the non-network condition. Specifically, we
expect 1) the level of certainty about the vote choice, and 2) the consistency between preferences
and vote choice to be lower when respondents are are exposed to political disagreement.
In addition to predicting these changes in voting behavior, this model has implications for how
individuals search for information. Most clearly, voters confronted by disagreement should gather
different types of information than voters who are situated in agreeable interactions (Hypothesis
3). As suggested by McPhee (and consistent with the logic of motivated reasoning (Lodge &
Taber 2000)), disagreement should lead to an information search that is more extensive and self-
confirmatory. In other words, information should not be balanced across alternatives. Second, to
the degree that disagreement stimulates such an information search, the consequence should be
make it harder for voters to make decisions, even as they search for biased information (Hypothesis
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4). Although this process should lead citizens to both clarify their political interests and gather
more information, it should lead to confusion when citizens do encounter different points of view
in their network. For example, Diana Mutz demonstrates that voters who are exposed to “cross-
cutting” political talk are more likely to see the pros and cons of positions they do not hold, and
are subsequently more likely to become ambivalent about candidates (Mutz 2002a, Mutz 2002b).
2.3 The Information Shortcut Model
Like the information search model, our final model also sees social networks as a causal force.
The principal difference is that networks are treated as an information shortcut rather than a
factor driving the search for information. Traditionally, the literature on information shortcuts—or,
heuristics—focuses on social psychological variables such as group identity and partisanship (Lau
& Redlawsk 2001, Brady & Sniderman 1985, Rahn 1993). The basic behind such shortcuts is that
citizens do not have the time (nor the desire) to be fully informed about their electoral choices. As
a consequence, voters look for ways to make effective decisions under circumstances of incomplete
information (Lupia 1994, Popkin 1994).
Can social networks be heuristics? Martin (2009) has suggested that while people cannot
possibly understand complex networks, that the repetition of relational structures around people
can affect how people think about forming their own reputation. Other research implies that
people will look to others’ opinions in forming their own, often in the form of polls (Boudreau &
McCubbins 2010, Boudreau 2010) and other media representations of public opinion (Mutz 1998).
But most directly, Popkin (1994) suggests that voting behavior is strongly shaped by networks
because they are a relevant and trusted source. The idea is that significant similarity of your
network friends to yourself is a good representation of your own interests, and that they have no
reason to not be honest with you.1
As with the information search model, this model also predicts causal effects from networks
(Hypothesis 2). However, it suggests that there is value in political disagreement above and beyond
1Although they do not have direct evidence that voters use heuristics, Sokhey and McClurg (Forthcoming) show
that interest-based voting cannot be clearly explained by variables from the information search model. They suggest
that this possibly points to the use of networks as heuristics.(Sokhey & McClurg Forthcoming)
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any effects it may have on the information search. Because there is no a priori reason to believe
that the information search and information shortcut models are mutually exclusive, we have to
anticipate what outcomes would be consistent with this model whether or not the information search
model is supported. Here we leverage the fact that the search model has dynamic implications,
whereas the shortcut model does not. In other words, the shortcut model does not predict any
differences in information seeking, just a change in voting behavior (Hypothesis 5). However, if
networks also influence information seeking, then then there should be an impact on voting behavior
even after controlling for aspects of the information search. Because in this case the subjects are
only being asked about disagreement with a single person in their network, we expect that this
will clarify their position (Hypothesis 6); thinking about disagreement with a particular discussant
should help bring a subject’s interests into sharper focus.2
3 Design and Methods
To test these hypotheses, we designed an experiment with the following structure: 1) a pre-stimulus
questionnaire measuring demographics (5 minutes), 2) a simulated campaign with incomplete access
to campaign information (15 minutes), and 3) a voting period where subjects report perceptions of
candidates and cast a ballot (5 minutes). This basic structure mimics state-of-the-art designs for
studying information search and quality decision-making (Lau & Redlawsk 1997, Lau & Redlawsk
2006).
The campaign environments are simulated with a dynamic information board that exposes sub-
jects to a campaign information via a series of continuously scrolling tabs (see Figure 1). Each tab is
labeled according to the the type of information it contains (e.g., issue position or background), and
color-coded by candidate (e.g., red for the Republican candidate). Subjects search for information
by clicking on one of the tabs, and visiting a separate screen with information about a candidate
(adopted from actual campaigns). Because the tabs continue to scroll in the background, when a
voter returns to the main screen they are (randomly) exposed to a different set of information tabs.
2However, we might expect that if disagreement were repeated/widespread across the broader network, that the
effect would be to make voting decisions less rather than more clear (Sokhey & McClurg Forthcoming). We discuss
this possibility in greater detail in the discussion/conclusion section.
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This set-up mimics real campaign conditions—voters must make choices, and paying attention to
some things necessitates “skipping out” on others.
3.1 Experimental Stimulus
The experimental stimuli are designed to prime the respondent to consider disagreement in the
context of her own social network. The basic prime is to give respondents a “name generator,”
asking them who they talk to about important matters, and then asking them to identify which of
the named people they disagree with the most. The salience of disagreement is assured by asking
subjects to report how much they disagree with that person on five different political issues.3 There
are two basic variations in the manipulations across experiments: 1) the absence or delivery of the
interpersonal disagreement prime to the subject, and 2) the delivery of it either before or after the
dynamic information board.
The first condition is a control group consisting of subjects that participate in the process
outlined above, but without any stimulus that priming their social network. It is most valuable for
testing the possibility that political disagreement has causal effects, primarily by comparing the
voting behavior of the subjects. To the degree that voters exhibit different behaviors, we can be
confident the difference is caused by the stimulus.
The second and third conditions prime subjects to think about their disagreeable political
interactions, but as noted, at different points in the process. Subjects in the second condition
are primed before searching for information, and those in the third condition receive the prime
afterwards; this gives us leverage over the the impact of disagreement on the information search.
While these comparisons do not resolve all of our questions about the different models of political
disagreement (we discuss this further in the sections that follow), they do give us at least some
additional leverage over the questions motivating this research.
3A pilot test of this procedure with SIU students showed that subjects in different conditions reported signifi-
cantly different levels of disagreement or agreement on these issues, based upon the manipulation. This provided us
confidence in the validity of this method.
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3.2 Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables measure how subjects search for information and make decisions. Following
other scholars in this vein (Lau & Redlawsk 2006, Redlawsk 2004, Jacoby, Chestnut, Weigl &
Fisher 1976, Huang & Price 2001), we use four indicators of how voters search for information.
The first measure is the depth of the search, which is measured as the total number of items that a
subject accessed on the information board. The second measure is the comparability of the search;
this is measured a the number of unique attributes (issue positions, candidate characteristics, and
endorsements) that were accessed for both the Democratic and Republican candidates. The third
measure is the content of search. Here, we are interested in how much information subjects relied
on concerning economic or social issues; we concern ourselves with this given that one treatment
group was primed prior to the campaign to think about interpersonal disagreement on economic
and social issues. To create these two variables, each issue in the mock campaign was coded as
economic or social. Then, just as with depth of search, we summed up the number of items that
were accessed for social and economic issues—this gives us the total number of times that economic
issues were accessed, and the total number of times that social issues were accessed.
The final measure of information seeking is the sequence of search, which refers to how subjects
transition from one piece of information to another. There are four possible transitions: 1) A subject
can transition from one candidate to another but stay on the same attribute (inter candidate, intra
attribute transitions); 2) A subject could transition from one attribute to another on the same
candidate (intra candidate, inter attribute). These first two transitions are characteristic of ordered
searches, much like one would expect via rational choice models. The remaining two transitions are
considered random transitions: 3) A subject can either transition from one attribute to another, and
one candidate to another (inter candidate, inter attribute search), 4) or the subject can re-examine
a piece of information (intra candidate, intra attribute).
With the sequence of search, we are most interested in the ratio or random to ordered transitions,
or in other words, the proportion of the search that was ordered vs. random. To create this variable
we divided the number of ordered transitions by the number of random transitions. Numbers greater
than one indicate that a majority of a subject’s search was ordered, while numbers less than one
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indicate that most of a subject’s search was random.
There are several dependent variables we consider with regards to decision-making. First, we
consider how the subjects cast their vote. Votes for the Democratic candidate are coded as 0, and
votes for the Republican candidate are coded as 1. We also consider how ambivalent subjects were
about the candidates. We asked subjects to name up to five things that they liked and disliked
about each of the candidates. We compute three measures of ambivalence using the Thompson et
al. (1995) formula:
positive mentions+ negative mentions
2
− |positive mentions− negative mentions|
Ambivalence ranges from -2.5 (most unambivalent) to 5 (most ambivalent). The three measures
of ambivalence are (1) ambivalence toward the Democratic candidate, (2) ambivalence toward the
Republican candidate, and (3) combined ambivalence towards the two candidates.
3.3 Subject Recruitment
Consistent with other research in the field (e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 1997), we recruited experimental
subjects from the adult population of a small Midwestern town. To do this effectively, we offered
respondents a $10 incentive to participate in return for roughly 30-40 minutes of their time. Pretests
of this experimental design suggest that students are a convenient, but still distinctive population.
Given that the experiment is fairly involved, we find that adult volunteers take the task more





In all, one hundred subjects participated in the experiment. Table 1 presents the average character-
istics of our subject pool, separated by experimental condition. While we can make no statements
about how the subject pool matches the broader community, these data show that we succeeded in
recruiting a relatively diverse group. The average subject was 35 years old (the standard deviation
was 16 years, and the oldest subject was 87), and women made up over 60% of the sample. The
respondents reported household incomes that on average ranged between $40,000-$50,000 (with
a standard deviation that covers a significant range of incomes).4 Education was someone more
constrained, with 64% of the respondents reporting having at least some college. Race was fairly
homogeneous, with 79% self-identifying as Caucasian.
We also asked subjects to provide self-reports on a variety of standard political items. On
average—and perhaps not unexpectedly— our subjects report a high level of political interest,
with 64% of them saying that they were either “moderately” or “very interested’ in politics. In
terms of political knowledge, subjects also averaged nearly four correct questions out of a possible
five, signaling a high degree of sophistication about politics. The pool had a Democratic lean to
it, with 52% saying they were Democrats, 17% identifying themselves as Republicans, and 29%
claiming to be Independents (this included leaners); ideology had a similar distribution. Finally,
subjects were not optimistic about current affairs: on a scale from 1 (excellent) to 4 (poor), all but
8% said that the economy was poor or “not so good.” However, 70% approved of the president’s
current performance, reflecting their Democratic leanings.
Table 1 also provides evidence of the effectiveness of our attempts to randomize subjects. We
checked balance across our experimental conditions for a full range of demographic and political
characteristics (using a series of analysis of variance models). The only factor that emerges as
significant–age–does not have any discernible impact on the dependent variables that we examine
4Coding for these variables is available from the authors.
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Table 1: Select Respondent Characteristics by Experimental Condition
Experimental Condition
Subject Characteristics Control Disagreement Before Disagreement After Significance
Age 40 36 30 *
Gender 60% 63% 63%
Income 10.6 8.2 8.9
Interest 3.8 3.7 3.6
Political Knowledge 3.5 3.6 3.9
Partisan Identification 2.6 3.1 3.1
Ideology 3.0 3.1 3.3
Economic Approval 1.7 1.8 1.9
Presidential Approval 1.3 1.3 1.3
*p < .05, F-test.
below.
4.1.2 Manipulation Check and Measurement
Table 2 provides a check on our experimental stimulus—i.e., priming people to think about dis-
agreement. When subjects were asked to think about the person they most disagree with before
the mock election, they experienced significantly higher amounts of disagreement, both in terms
of economic issues, social issues, and a combined index of disagreement and frequency (we discuss
this measure in greater detail in the section below). That being said, subjects in both treatment
conditions experienced substantial disagreement (average scores of over 7), so we are satisfied that
our manipulation was effective.
Given that our stimulus relies on subjects’ self-reported network, there is a great deal of natural
heterogeneity in the extent to which subjects thought about interpersonal disagreement. A subject
who reports not disagreeing with the most disagreeable person in their network (and reports having
similar views to this person) has not been primed to think about disagreement, much like a person
in the control condition who is never asked to consider this. To account for this, we create an
indexed measure of the two treatment conditions.
To create these indexes, we use three measures from the network battery. First, we consider
the frequency with which the subject and the person they report to disagree with most disagree.
Responses ranged from never to often on a four point scale. Second, we ask subjects to read a
12
Table 2: Respondent Exposure to Disagreement by Experimental Condition
Experimental Condition
Subject Characteristics Disagreement Before Disagreement After Significance
Discussion Frequency 2.9 3.0
Disagree on Economy Issues 2.4 2.0 *
Disagree on Social Issues 2.6 2.0 *
Disagreement Index 7.9 7.1 *
*p < .10, F-test.
passage about an economic policy and a social policy, and for each rate how much the subject and
this named person would disagree. Responses ranged from “not at all” to “a lot” on a four point
scale. We then summed each of these variables. Since the index is meant to capture the extent to
which subjects were primed to think about disagreement in their network, subjects in the control
group were coded as 0, signifying that they were not primed. Finally we multiply this index by
dummy variables that indicate whether the subject was assigned to receive the network battery
prior to the campaign, or after the campaign (with the control group serving as the comparison).
4.2 Disagreement and Information Search
Results for the effect of network disagreement on the information search variables are presented in
Tables 3 and 4. The models presented are OLS regressions, clustering the standard errors around
the experimental condition. In Table 3 we regress the indices of network disagreement for both
treatment conditions on each of the information search variables . Starting with the depth of search,
we we have two variables that we consider: the total number of items accessed on the information
board, and the average amount of time subjects spent reading about each accessed item. Time
turns out to be inconsequential in this model. However, the total number of items accessed is
affected by the network stimulus. Looting at the first row of Table 3, subjects who received the
network battery prior to the campaign (and were primed about disagreement) searched for more
information than those in the control condition. This finding is supports Hypothesis 3 (under the
information search model), and is consistent with how McPhee (1963) suggests social networks
should influence decision-making.
Interestingly, the results also indicate that subjects who received the network battery after the
13
campaign searched for more information that subjects in the control condition. Since subjects in this
treatment condition received the network battery after the campaign, it is not logical to conclude
that the disagreement prime affected the information search. Rather, the effect likely demonstrates
that there was something distinct about the subjects who received the network battery after the
campaign (when compared to the control group). By the information search model, we also would
expect disagreement in a person’s network to lead to voters comparing less information (Hypothesis
3). However, in our study we find that subjects in the relevant treatment condition were no more
likely to compare information than subjects in the control condition.
Turning to the sequence of search, subjects who were primed to think about disagreement within
their network prior to the campaign searched for information in a more random manner than those
in the control condition. Though the coefficient is quite small, the negative sign indicates that there
there were more random transitions than ordered transitions; this is also consistent with Hypothesis
3. In part, this finding supports the notion that exposure to disagreement in one’s network leads to
confusion. The fact that subjects who were exposed to the network battery prior to the campaign
had a more random search indicates that they might be unsure of how to conduct themselves.
Finally, in the last rows of the table we consider the content of the subject’s search. Here
the findings are mixed. Subjects who received the network battery prior to the campaign were less
likely (than subjects in the control group) to search for information on social issues; this is indicated
by the negative coefficient. This finding supports the expectations provided under Hypothesis 3.
However, the same is not true for economic issues. There were no statistical differences in the search
patters for subjects who received the network battery prior to the campaign. However, we do find
significant differences between subjects who were primed to think about disagreement within their
network after the campaign. Like depth of search, this cannot logically be indicative of a network
effect, but rather, perhaps that there is something different about the subjects in these two groups.
As a check on our findings, we present a second model that contains additional possible explana-
tions for differences in how subjects search for information. Here we focus on the three information
search variables that were significant in 3. In Table 4 we regress depth, sequence, and content of
search on the treatment group, the strength of a subject’s party affiliation, her level of education,
14
Table 3: Regression of Information Search Variables (Basic Model)
Dependent Variable Constant Before After
Depth 40.81** 0.22* 0.47**
(0.61) (0.07) (0.08)
Time 9.88** -0.15 0.11
(0.61) (0.07) (0.07)
Comparability 13.88** -0.04 0.08
(0.61) (0.07) (0.08)
Sequence 1.01** -0.01* -0.01
(0.3) (0.00) (0.00)
Social Content 9.29** -0.16* 0.03
(0.38) (0.04) (0.05)
Economic Content 4.65** 0.01 0.12**
0.21 (0.03) (0.03)
Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates with clustered standard
errors in parentheses.
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
age, and stock of political knowledge. Only one finding holds up to this scrutiny—receiving the
network treatment before the campaign affects how subjects transition from one piece of infor-
mation to another. Just like in Table 3, subjects who received the network battery prior to the
campaign engaged in more of a random search for information than subjects in the control group.
This consistency across models demonstrates the robustness of this result. This finding supports
Hypothesis 3—i.e., the idea that exposure to network disagreement affects how people search for
information.
4.3 Disagreement and Voting Behavior
The second part of our analysis focuses on the relationship between disagreement and voter decision-
making. Here we examine two post-election indicators of decision-making. The first of these is the
clarity of the voter’s choices, judged by their level of ambivalence. The second is vote choice, where
we focus on whether or not disagreement affects the relationship between the voter’s partisan
predilections (measured by party identification) and their vote. The information search model
predicts that disagreement should significantly influence these variables (Hypothesis 2) by making
15
Table 4: Regression of Information Search Variables
Depth Sequence Social Content
Constant 24.38** 1.38 3.64*
(2.04) (0.51) (1.38)
Treat Before Index 0.14 -0.01** -0.16
(0.20) (0.00) (0.04)
Party Strength 2.11** -0.01 0.33
(0.16) (0.05) (0.17)
Education 4.22** -0.06 0.61**
(0.30) (0.09) (0.03)
Age -0.05 0.001 0.02
(0.07) (0.001) (0.03)
Knowledge 0.10 -0.04 0.58
(1.52) (0.06) (0.19)
Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates with clustered standard
errors in parentheses.
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Table 5: Disagreement, Political Knowledge, and Ambivalence
Candidate Ambivalence
β s.e. β s.e.
Disagreement Before Campaign 0.08 0.02** 0.07 0.01**
Disagreement After Campaign -0.06 0.02* -0.10 0.01**
Political Knowledge 0.61 0.14**
Constant 2.07 0.13 -0.04 0.57
Observations 100 100
R2 0.03 0.12
*p < .05, **p < .10, two-tailed t-test.
voters more ambivalent and less clear about their decisions (Hypothesis 4). And, while the heuristic
model also implies that disagreement will influence voting behavior, it implies that it should actually
clarify the choice (Hypothesis 6).
The analysis begins in table 5, where we present two OLS models, again using clustered standard
errors. The first model is a straightforward test of our hypotheses; the second includes our political
knowledge index to test the robustness of our results.5 The results provide strong evidence for all
three hypotheses. In the first results (left column), we see that priming subjects to thinking about
5In results not shown here, we also control for ideology and partisanship—they do not significantly affect the
results.
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Table 6: Disagreement, Partisanship, and Vote Choice
Probability of Voting Republican
β s.e.
Partisan Identification 1.37 0.32**
Disagreement Before Campaign 0.17 0.22
Disagreement After Campaign -9.43 0.93**
PID x Before -0.02 0.03




*p < .05, **p < .10, two-tailed t-test.
their most disagreeable interaction affects ambivalence. Prior to the campaign, the coefficient
is positive and significant, meaning that subjects exposed to disagreement before starting the
campaign are more ambivalent about the candidates. The opposite effect obtains when the prime
comes after the election, making subjects less ambivalent. Even controlling for political knowledge
(which makes our subjects more ambivalent here, likely because the experiment is designed to have
similar candidates), these effects hold.
The logit coefficients in table 6 represent a different test of our hypotheses, and somewhat
different results. First, note that we measure certainty here indirectly, using the standard seven-
point partisanship scale and interaction terms to examine how disagreement influences eventual
voting behavior. Regarding the information search model, we find no support for either Hypothesis 2
or Hypothesis 4. Although the interaction coefficient between experiencing disagreement before and
“PID” points in the correct direction—reducing the size of the party identification coeffient—it is
statistically insignificant. In results not shown here, this conclusion does not change when we control
for ambivalence and its interaction with partisanship. This suggests that while there is evidence
that disagreement may affect impressions of candidates through the information search process, it
does not seem to be driving the choice itself. Of course, this does not mean that those effects do not
matter for behaviors such as political involvement (Mutz 2006). Indeed, the results suggest that
disagreement can potentially have different consequences based on the specific behavioral process
under consideration (Klofstad, Sokhey & McClurg 2010).
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The evidence for the heuristic model is much stronger in this test of our hypotheses. To get a
substantive handle on this, compare the impact of partisanship on the probability the respondent
reported voting for the Republican candidate (25% across all conditions) in our simulated campaign.
For subjects not exposed to disagreement before or after the campaign, the coefficient for party
identification is 1.37. For the respondent exposed to disagreement after the campaign, the coefficient
is 3.76.6 This is nearly triple the effect for people not exposed to disagreement. While we would
be remiss not to point (again) to the fact that the direction of this effect would be different if
the amount of disgreement in the broader network were to increase, this is strong evidence of the
potential heuristic value of interpersonal disagreement (Hypothesis 6).
5 Discussion
The experimental results represent progress in understanding the questions that motivate this
paper: does social disagreement causally affect voting behavior, and if so, how? To the degree
that we introduce political disagreement as a consideration to our experimental subjects, we find
that they manifest different ways of searching for information, of forming likes and dislikes about
potential candidates, and in linking their partisan views to their eventual votes. Although there are
still many questions left to answer, at this point our evidence suggests that political disagreement
can have causal effects on citizens. Here our results join a growing number of (field) experimental
studies validating generations of empirical studies(Gerber, Green & Larimer 2008, Klofstad 2001,
Klofstad 2007, Nickerson 2008).
While such results are significant in themselves, we also break new ground by exploring the
potential mechanisms connecting political disagreement to changes in voting behavior. We examine
two different—but potentially complimentary—models of how disagreement with our social contacts
influence us (the results address the “no results” model). With respect to the information search
model, we find evidence that being primed to think about disagreement before a campaign can
lead to a less orderly search process. Similar evidence exists suggesting that disagreement affects
6Of course, we are aware that this is the not the total effect since the direct effect of disagreement after the
campaign needs to be included.
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the sequence of the search, and the desire to seek out information on social issues (though here our
finds are less robust). In terms of post-election evaluations, there seems to an effect on candidate
ambivalence, but not on the link between vote choice and partisan preferences. All in all, there is
thin evidence that this is the principal mechanism connecting disagreement and voting behavior.
As we noted previously, this is not to say that the effects we do find (regarding ambivalence) are
not more strongly related to the decision participate in politics, a possibility supported by the
observational studies cited earlier.
There is stronger evidence in support of the information use, or heuristic, model. In our exam-
ination of both post-campaign variables, we find a statistically, sizable relationship with disagree-
ment primed after the campaign; this suggests that it helps clarify the subjects’ decisions. Being
primed to consider disagreement not only makes subjects less ambivalent, but it makes the impact
of partisanship on eventual vote choice much more substantively strong. The theoretical process
believed to be at play here is simple–by contrasting yourself with a social contact with which you
disagree, your own preferences come into clearer focus. We have alluded to the fact that the value
of this simple heuristic might change in the context of the larger network, as suggested by Sokhey
and McClurg (Forthcoming), but have no evidence on this point in these results.
Though these results help address the questions that were the starting point for this experiment,
ambiguity remains and there is much left to do. In particular, two limitations of our experiment
provide the most promising way to proceed. Both of these limitations stem from potential skepticism
over whether/how these results relate to what can reasonably be called a social network effect. One
such possibility is that what our results have uncovered is evidence of a partial network/dyad effect,
rather than a broader network effect. Indeed, such a possibility has been raised in previous research
that tries to understand how networks relate to participatory behavior (Mutz 2006, McClurg 2006a,
McClurg 2006b). This raises the question of whether we have primed thinking about the network,
or primed a different kind of disagreement via asking people to think about a particular discussant.
While our use of an index within experimental conditions suggests to us that we have at least tapped
aspects of the broader network, other network primes–including a comparison between agreement
and disagreement–are needed before we can be more certain.
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From a different perspective, our results may seen through the lens of information effects more
generally, rather than as social network effects. While have not approached questions concerning
the roles of intimacy, credibility, and trust in underlying social network effects, few would argue
that disagreements with our friends and family are substantively different from the disagreement
experienced elsewhere in the world (e.g., a pundit on television). Before we can truly understand
social networks and political behavior, it is important to clarify whether networks merely provide a
type of stimulus to harried voters, or if they provide something different. To that end, comparing our
socially-oriented stimulus with others–e.g., newspaper reports–in the same experimental context,
would help shed light on these issues.
While these limitations (and others not listed here) clearly point to ways that our analysis can
be improved, they should not make us overlook or discount the results. Of significant importance
is the contrast between the two mechanisms. While we find some evidence on behalf of both,
the evidence here points to the heuristics-model as being more consequential for these particular
variables. While it may be tempting to discount the information search model (given the weaker
evidence), we are not yet convinced of this. First, and most importantly, we are aware that we
have only primed one part of a complex set of interdependent social relationships. As by our
own admission incorporating more information from the network would change the direction of
the heuristic effect, it is possible that its impact on information seeking would look different when
examined in this broader context; it is in this regard that we believe observational studies are still
advantaged over studies like ours. Finally, we would note that the results also raise the possibility
that networks effects cannot be thought of in simple terms such as “disagreement does this,” or
“expertise affects that.” Rather, just as the effects of disagreement and expertise may vary based




1. respondent id: an index, which will also provide the original order of subjects
2. condition:
(a) Control
(b) Subjects received the network battery before the campaign
(c) Subjects received the network battery after the campaign, but before the vote
3. unix: The unix time when the subject began the study.
4. ip: ip address of the computer that the subject used.








6. ideology: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. When it comes to
politics, do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate









7. age: How many years old are you?
8. gender: What gender are you?
(a) Female
(b) Male







10. registered: Are you registered and eligible to vote so that you could vote in the next election
if you wanted to?
(a) No
(b) Yes
11. vote last: In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not
able to vote because they weren’t registered, they were sick, or they just didn’t have time.
Which of the following statements best describes you in the November 2008 election:
(a) I did not vote
(b) I thought about voting this time, but didn’t
22
(c) I usually vote, but didn’t this time
(d) I am sure I voted
12. education: What is the highest degree that you have earned?¡
(a) Grade school or less (0-8 grades
(b) High school (12 grades or fewer, incl. non-college training if applicable)
(c) Some college (13 grades or more but no degree)
(d) College or advanced degree
13. employed: We would like to know a little bit about your employment status. Which of the
follow best describes your employment status?
(a) I have a full-time job
(b) I have a part-time job
(c) Unemployed/I do not work
14. income: What was your total HOUSEHOLD income in the past 12 months? Please include
your income PLUS income of all members living in your household (including cohabiting
partners and armed forces members living at home). Please count income BEFORE TAXES,
including income from all sources (such as wages, salaries, tips, net income from a business,
interest, dividends, child support, alimony, and Social Security, public assistance, pensions,
or retirement benefits).
(a) Less than $5,000
(b) $5,000 to $7,499
(c) $7,500 to $9,999
(d) $10,000 to $12,499
(e) $12,500 to $14,999
(f) $15,000 to $19,999
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(g) $20,000 to $24,999
(h) $25,000 to $29,999
(i) $30,000 to $34,999
(j) $35,000 to $39,999
(k) $40,000 to $49,999
(l) $50,000 to $59,999
(m) $60,000 to $74,999
(n) $75,000 to $84,999
(o) $85,000 to $99,999
(p) $100,000 to $124,999
(q) $125,000 to $149,999
(r) $150,000 to $174,999
(s) $175,000 or more
15. interest: How interested are you in information about what’s going on in government and
politics?


























18. internet news: During a typical week, how many days do you watch or read news on the
































23. vp: Do you happen to know what job or political office is now held by Joe Biden?
() Incorrect Response
(a) Correct Response




25. knowledge: An index of the five item political knowledge questions (veto, majority, consti-
tutional, vp, and conservative).




27. economy: Would you describe the state of the nation’s economy these days as–excellent,
good, not so good, or poor?
(a) Excellent
(b) Good
(c) Not So Good
(d) Poor





Personality Questions: Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply
to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following
traits. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one
characteristic applies more strongly than the other.



















































































39. From time to time, people discuss important matters with other people. we’d like to get the
names of three people with whom you talk on a regular basis about these sorts of things. All










41. disc freq: When you talk to (insert answer from disagree most), do you discuss political





42. disagree freq: How often would you say that you and (insert answer from disagree most)





43. disagree econ: Please read the following passage:
When I am elected president, I will fight for a trade policy that opens up foreign markets
to support good American jobs. I will use trade agreements to spread good labor and en-
vironmental standards around the world and stand firm against agreements like the Central
American Free Trade Agreement that fail to live up to those important benchmarks. I will
also pressure the World Trade Organization to enforce trade agreements and stop countries
from continuing unfair government subsidies to foreign exporters and non tariff barriers on
U.S. exports.
If (insert answer from disagree most) and you were talking about the statement you just read,
how much do you think you would disagree? Would you disagree a lot, some, a little, or not
at all?
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44. disagree soc: Please read the following passage:
Roe v. Wade is a flawed decision that must be overturned and as president I will nominate
judges who understand that courts should not be in the business of legislating from the bench.
Constitutional balance would be restored by the reversal of Roe v. Wade, returning the abor-
tion question to the individual states. The difficult issue of abortion should not be decided
by judicial fiat. However, the reversal of Roe v. Wade represents only one step in the long
path toward ending abortion. I am pro-life. With the exception of a doctor’s determination
that the mother’s life would end if the pregnancy continued. I believe that no matter what
mistakes we make as a society, we cannot condone ending another life.
If (insert answer from disagree most) and you were talking about the statement you just read,
how much do you think you would disagree? Would you disagree a lot, some, a little, or not
at all?




45. ambiv dem: Level of ambivalence toward the Democratic candidate using the Lavine (2001)
formula: (numberpositivementions+numbernegativementions)/2−|numberpositivementions−
numbernegativementions|. Ambivalence ranges from -2.5 (most unambivalent) to 5 (most
ambivalent).
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46. ambiv rep: Level of ambivalence toward the Republican candidate using the Lavine (2001)
formula: (numberpositivementions+numbernegativementions)/2−|numberpositivementions−
numbernegativementions|. Ambivalence ranges from -2.5 (most unambivalent) to 5 (most
ambivalent).
47. ambiv: Overall level of ambivalence towards both candidates using the Lavine (2001) formula:
(numberpositivementions+numbernevativementions)/2−|numberpositivementions−numbernegativementions|.
Ambivalence ranges from -5 (most unambivalent) to 10 (most ambivalent).
48. depth: Total number of campaign items accessed during the mock campaign.
49. comparability: Total number of unique items compared between the Democratic and Re-
publican candidate.
50. transition1: Count of the number of inter-candidate, inter-attribute (Examine a different
candidate and different attribute from the one just examined.).
51. transition2: Count of the number of inter-candidate, intra-attribute transitions (Examine
the same attribute as the one just examined, but for a different candidate)
52. transition3: Count of the number of intra-candidate, inter-attribute transitions (Transitions
from one attribute to another for the same candidate that was just examined).
53. transition4: Count of the number of intra-candidate, intra-attribute transitions (Reexamine
the same piece of information two times in a row).
54. postran1: Count of the number of possible inter-candidate, inter-attribute (Examine a dif-
ferent candidate and different attribute from the one just examined.).
55. posttran2: Count of the number of possible inter-candidate, intra-attribute transitions (Ex-
amine the same attribute as the one just examined, but for a different candidate)
56. postran3: Count of the number of possible intra-candidate, inter-attribute transitions (Tran-
sitions from one attribute to another for the same candidate that was just examined).
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57. postran4: Count of the number of possible intra-candidate, intra-attribute transitions (Re-
examine the same piece of information two times in a row).
58. ordered The percent of the search that is ordered. It is the number of intra-candidate, inter-
attribute transitions (transition3) and inter-candidate, intra-attribute transition (transition2)
divided by the total number of transitions available (depth− 1).
59. time The average amount of time subject spent reading content.
60. content soc: Amount of information on social issues that was examined.
61. content econ: Amount of information on economic issues that was examined.
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